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Abstract. - When users rate objects, a sophisticated algorithm that takes into account ability
or reputation may produce a fairer or more accurate aggregation of ratings than the straightfor-
ward arithmetic average. Recently a number of authors have proposed different co-determination
algorithms where estimates of user and object reputation are refined iteratively together, permit-
ting accurate measures of both to be derived directly from the rating data. However, simulations
demonstrating these methods’ efficacy assumed a continuum of rating values, consistent with typ-
ical physical modelling practice, whereas in most actual rating systems only a limited range of
discrete values (such as a 5-star system) is employed. We perform a comparative test of several
co-determination algorithms with different scales of discrete ratings and show that this seemingly
minor modification in fact has a significant impact on algorithms’ performance. Paradoxically,
where rating resolution is low, increased noise in users’ ratings may even improve the overall
performance of the system.
Introduction. – With the growth of the internet
and e-commerce [1], an increasing number of our so-
cial and commercial interactions are now one-shot ex-
changes with strangers identifiable only by easily-replaced
pseudonyms [2]. Similarly, most items on sale from e-
commerce websites must be purchased without an oppor-
tunity to try them first, creating an information asymme-
try that encourages the provision of low-quality goods [3].
To offset this risk of fraud or deception, many online ser-
vices implement reputation systems [4] that collect ratings
and feedback from users so as to provide a measure of
trustworthiness for goods or individuals.
A key challenge is how to aggregate this feedback ef-
fectively given that not all ratings are equal. Some users’
judgement may be poor or malicious: for example, many
eBay users forgo issuing deserved negative feedback to
cheaters because the negative feedback they will receive in
reprisal will devastate their own carefully cultivated good
reputation [5]. An effective reputation system thus needs
to distinguish between good and bad raters and ratings.
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One approach to this has been the development of co-
determination algorithms of reputation, where aggregate
reputation (or quality) of rated objects1 is used to estimate
a corresponding reputation (or ability) for the system’s
users, and this latter measure is then used to re-weight
the aggregation of ratings for objects [6–8]. By iterat-
ing this procedure over time, ratings from malicious or
unskilled users can be weeded out, providing both a bet-
ter estimation of object quality and an enhanced overall
reputation-based ranking of objects.
Simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of these meth-
ods followed typical modelling practices in physics and
applied mathematics, assuming a continuum of rating val-
ues (reflecting what may be presumed to be fine-grained
shades of opinion). However, a near-universal feature of
real user feedback and rating systems is that they permit
ratings to take only a limited range of discrete values—
most commonly the 5-star system employed by Amazon,
1 We use ‘object’ simply as a generic term: the object of the
rating. This might be an actual object, such as a book or CD, or
it might be a person or organization, such as an eBay auctioneer, a
website, or an Amazon Marketplace seller.
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YouTube, etc. The influence of this constraint has never
been tested on the aforementioned algorithms, and the
main purpose of the present letter is to explore how this
quantization of ratings affects the co-determination pro-
cedure and the resulting ranking and reputation values.
Our simulations show that if the number of available
rating choices is too few, this has a strong negative impact
on the algorithms’ performance. Paradoxically, in such
circumstances, having a community of users more prone
to individual rating errors may actually increase the over-
all performance of the system. We compare these results
with psychometric research on the measurement of atti-
tudes, and discuss the implications for the construction of
effective online reputation, ranking and rating systems.
Algorithms. – The reputation and ranking algo-
rithms explored in this paper all operate upon the same
basic type of data. Suppose we have a set U of users who
have each rated some subset of the complete set O of ob-
jects. For notational clarity we use Latin letters (i, j, . . . )
for user-related indices and Greek letters (α, β, . . . ) for
object-related indices. The set of users who rated a given
object α is denoted by Uα, while the set of objects rated
by a user i is denoted by Oi, and the value of the rating
of object α by user i is denoted by riα.
We assume that each object has an intrinsic quality Qα
from which the received ratings differ to a greater or lesser
degree depending on the ability of the user. While in
some online reputation systems there is an opportunity for
users to ‘rate the ratings’, providing an extra measure of
user reputation, we do not rely on the availability of such
information: all the algorithms described here calculate
user ability solely on the basis of the rating data. On the
basis of such measures of user ability we can then estimate
object quality using a weighted average of the ratings,
qα =
∑
i∈Uα
wiriα
/∑
i∈Uα
wi , (1)
where the user weights wi are constructed by one of the
following algorithms.
(i) Arithmetic average (AA). The baseline for compari-
son of reputation and ranking methods is simply to treat
all user ratings equally, setting wi = const ∀ i ∈ U , or
qα =
1
|Uα|
∑
i∈Uα
riα , (2)
which is of course the actual aggregation method used on
most websites.
(ii) Mizzaro’s algorithm (Mizz). Mizzaro [6] has intro-
duced a co-determination algorithm for the assessment of
scholarly articles, with reputation scores for authors, arti-
cles and readers that co-evolve over time according to the
ratings readers give to papers. The algorithm can readily
be applied to the more general user-object case we consider
here, with author scores omitted since their evolution is
decoupled from the evolution of article and reader scores
and they are irrelevant in the present context. For con-
sistency with the rest of the paper we refer henceforth to
objects and users instead of articles and readers.
The algorithm can be implemented in two versions, an
incremental one where ratings are added one by one and
an iterative one that can be applied to a pre-existing
dataset. We have implemented both versions (which in
any case, given the same data, produce the same result),
but for ease of comparison to the other algorithms we de-
scribe here the simpler, iterative version.
Given a set of user weights wi, object quality values qα
are calculated according to Eq. (1). User weights are then
recalculated according to,
wi =
∑
α∈Oi
sαgiα∑
α∈Oi
sα
(3)
where
sα =
∑
j∈Uα
wj (4)
is a measure of steadiness of object quality qα, and
giα = 1−
√
|riα − qα|/∆r (5)
is a measure of disagreement between the given rating and
the object score. ∆r represents the width of the rating
range, i.e. the difference between the smallest and largest
possible rating values, and this normalization guarantees
that the value of g will fall within the range [0; 1].
The algorithm is initialized by setting equal weights
wi = 1 for all users i and then iterating repeatedly over the
equations (1, 3) until the change in the vector of quality
estimates between successive iteration steps,
|q − q′| :=
[
1
|O|
∑
α∈O
(qα − q
′
α)
2
]1/2
, (6)
falls below a certain threshold value2 ∆ (in our simula-
tions, we use ∆ = 10−4).
(iii) The Yu-Zhang-Laureti-Moret algorithm (YZLM).
Yu and colleagues [7] have introduced an algorithm that
is essentially a generalized version of maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) [9], using a control parameter β ≥ 0 to
determine how divergence from the community consensus
affects user weight wi. Their own implementation consid-
ers only the case where all users have rated all objects,
but it is trivial to generalize it to operate on sparse data.
Estimated object quality values qα are again calculated
according to Eq. 1. We then calculate the divergence be-
tween the ratings of each user i and the estimated object
quality values,
di =
1
|Oi|
∑
α∈Oi
(riα − qα)
2 , (7)
2 Note that the algorithm may fail to converge if the threshold
∆ is set too low [8]. Conversely, too large a threshold may disrupt
the iterative process. It may therefore take a few trials to choose an
appropriate value.
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and the updated weight of user i is then given by
wi = (di + ε)
−β
, (8)
where the exponent β ≥ 0 determines the strength of the
penalty applied to users with larger rating divergence di
(note that β = 0 corresponds simply to the arithmetic av-
erage) and 0 < ε ≪ 1 is a small positive constant so as
to prevent user weights diverging (in our simulations, we
use ε = 10−8). Yu et al. [7] noted that while β = 1/2 pro-
vides better numerical stability of the algorithm as well
as translational and scale invariance, β = 1 is the optimal
algorithm from the point of view of mathematical statis-
tics [10]. We have used β = 1 because it yields superior
performance, but choosing β = 1/2 does not alter the fun-
damental character of the results obtained here.
The algorithm is initialized like Mizz, by setting the
weights wi = 1 for all users i and then iterating repeat-
edly over the equations (1, 7, 8) until the vector of quality
estimates q changes less than the threshold value ∆.
(iv) de Kerchove and Van Dooren’s algorithm (dKVD).
De Kerchove and Van Dooren [8] have introduced an al-
gorithm similar to YZLM, but where the weight update
function is given instead by
wi = 1− kdi , (9)
where k is chosen such that wi ≥ 0. This has the ad-
vantage of guaranteeing convergence to a unique solution
independent of starting weights (though in practice this
is not a particular problem with any of the algorithms).
In our simulations we adopt the strongest possible pun-
ishment of noisy raters by setting k = [ε+maxj∈U dj ]
−1,
where ε ensures non-zero weights if the dj are all identi-
cal. The algorithm is initialized in a similar manner to
Mizz and YZLM by setting wi = 1 for all users i and then
iterating over Eqs. (1, 7, 9) until the vector of quality
estimates q changes less than the threshold value ∆.
Artificial datasets. – To test the methods described
above, we create artificial datasets in the following way.
For each object α we randomly generate a real-valued true
quality value Qα from the uniform distribution
3 U [1;R],
where R is an integer ≥ 2. Similarly, for each user i we
randomly generate a personal error level σi from the dis-
tribution U [σmin;σmax], where σmin and σmax scale with
the width ∆r = R−1 of the rating scale. For a given spar-
sity of the dataset 0 < η ≤ 1, we randomly select η|U||O|
unique user-object pairs4 iα and generate corresponding
3 It is possible to use non-uniform distributions, but given the
limited rating scale this makes little practical difference. A more
pertinent question is whether there can actually be such a thing
as a ‘true’, objective quality value. The reasonableness of this as-
sumption will vary depending on what kind of objects are being
considered, probably with particular reference to whether an object
will be assessed more on the basis of taste or functionality.
4 In the extremely rare case that an object or user ends up without
any such links, we discount them from further consideration, e.g.
when assessing algorithms’ performance.
individual user estimates of object quality according to,
qiα = Qα + Eiα (10)
where the quality estimation error Eiα is drawn from the
uniform distribution U [−σi;σi]. The actual ratings are
derived from these quality estimates depending on the de-
gree of quantization desired: for continuous-valued rat-
ings we simply take riα = qiα, while discrete rating values
are obtained by rounding to the nearest integer, that is,
riα = [qiα]. In both cases, values lying outside the pre-
scribed range [1;R] are truncated: those smaller than 1
are changed to 1 and those greater than R are changed to
R. This follows the real-life constraint that, no matter how
much a user may adore or detest a particular object, they
still cannot rate it higher or lower than the given rating
bounds. While changing R does not produce a qualita-
tive difference in outcome for continuous-valued ratings,
the constraint of discrete integer values means that R de-
termines the resolution of rating precision, that is, the
number of distinct discrete rating values. Note that since
we assume σmin and σmax scale with ∆r = R − 1 this is
equivalent to increasing the resolution by taking a higher
number of equally-spaced discrete rating values within a
fixed range: increasing the width of the rating scale and
taking integer values is simply easier to implement.
Performance metrics. – A simple and easy test of
algorithm performance is to compare the algorithm’s es-
timated quality values qα and the ‘true’ quality Qα, and
calculate the root-mean-square error [7],
∆Q :=
[
1
|O|
∑
α∈O
(
Qα − qα
)2]1/2
, (11)
using the normalization ∆Q/(R − 1) to compare per-
formance on datasets with different rating resolution R.
Since user weight is not expected to be equal to the true
user ability, we use Kendall’s τ rank correlation coeffi-
cient [11] to compare the true ability ranking of users ac-
cording to σ−1i with the estimated ranking given by wi. A
result of τ = 1 indicates that the true and estimated rank-
ings are identical, −1 that they are completely inverted,
and 0 that the rankings are entirely uncorrelated.
While well defined for artificial numerical simulations,
neither of these measures can easily be applied to real
data, where objective measures of object quality or user
ranking difficult or impossible to obtain. In the absence of
reliable per-item or per-user measures of accuracy, an ef-
fective approach is to specify a group of ‘relevant’ objects
or users and inspect their position in the ranking [12].
To do this we employ the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve [13], constructed by plotting for each place in
the ranking a point in [0, 1]2 whose x, y values correspond
respectively to the proportion of irrelevant and relevant
objects recovered so far. The ranking accuracy can then
be estimated by the area under the curve (AUC), which
equals 1 when every relevant object/user is ranked higher
p-3
Matu´sˇ Medo and Joseph Rushton Wakeling
continuous-valued ratings discrete ratings continuous-valued ratings discrete ratings(e) (g)
usersobjects
(a) (c)
0 1 2 3 4
σmax
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
∆
Q
/
4
AA
Mizz
YZLM
dKVD
0 1 2 3 4
σmax
0.96
0.98
1.00
A
U
C
AA
Mizz
YZLM
dKVD
(b)
0 1 2 3 4
σmax
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
∆
Q
/
4
AA
Mizz
YZLM
dKVD
0 1 2 3 4
σmax
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
A
U
C
AA
Mizz
YZLM
dKVD
(d)
0 1 2 3 4
σ
max
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
τ
Mizz
YZLM
dKVD
0 1 2 3 4
σ
max
0.992
0.994
0.996
0.998
1.000
A
U
C
Mizz
YZLM
dKVD
(f)
0 1 2 3 4
σ
max
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
τ
Mizz
YZLM
dKVD
(h)
0 1 2 3 4
σ
max
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
Mizz
YZLM
dKVD
Fig. 1: (colour online) Overview of co-determination algorithm performance as the upper bound σmax of user error is varied, for
continuous and discrete (integer) valued ratings in the interval [1; 5], with σmin = 0, |U| = 1000, |O| = 1000, η = 0.1, and results
averaged over 100 realizations. (a–d) Accuracy in estimating object quality for (a, b) continuous and (c, d) discrete ratings,
measured by ∆Q and AUC. For comparison to other figures, ∆Q is normalized with respect to the rating width ∆r = R−1 = 4.
(e–h) Accuracy in ranking user ability for (e, f) continuous and (g, h) discrete ratings, measured by Kendall’s τ rank correlation
coefficient and AUC. No results are shown for AA, as it does not rank users but considers them to all be equal.
than every irrelevant object/user, 0.5 when the distribu-
tion of relevant objects/users is random, and 0 when every
irrelevant object/user is ranked higher than every relevant
object/user. In the simulations presented here, we denote
as ‘relevant’ the 5% of objects/users with respectively the
highest true quality values Qα or lowest error σi.
Results. – For the results presented here we gener-
ated artificial datasets of 1000 users and 1000 objects,
with sparsity η = 0.1. For each simulation we used the
same datasets to test each reputation algorithm. Our first
simulations keep a constant rating resolution R = 5 and
a constant lower bound σmin = 0 for the distribution of
user’s personal error levels, while the upper bound σmax
was varied in the range [0; 4]. This range was chosen so
that, at its most extreme, the least skilled users (i.e. those
with σi ≈ σmax) could potentially rate a ‘perfect’ 5-star
object with the lowest rating value 1, and vice versa.
Figure 1a,b,e,f presents the performance of the algo-
rithms when we use continuous-valued ratings, i.e. when
riα = qiα exactly, and vary the upper error bound σmax.
We observe immediately that YZLM is by far the least sen-
sitive to the increasing error level, maintaining the low-
est object quality error ∆Q and the best user ranking
(Kendall’s τ), and the highest AUC (≈ 1) for both ob-
jects and users. This is because of all the methods YZLM
places the harshest sanction against ‘noisy’ raters who di-
verge from the aggregate estimated quality, a feature that
can be observed in the ranking of users, where we observe
near-identical values of τ for both YZLM and dKVD (their
weights and hence ranking stem from the same measure di
of user rating divergence) but consistently higher AUC for
YZLM (the very best users are more consistently pushed
to the top of the ranking due to the harsher sanction). The
superiority of YZLM is maintained across different sizes of
dataset and different data sparsity values, and is found to
be dependent primarily on σmin: if this lower error bound
is increased, results from all four algorithms become sim-
ilar as, in the absence of objectively good raters, there is
much less advantage to be had in discriminating between
better and worse5.
To assess the difference between continuous- and
discrete-valued ratings, we took the same sets of artifi-
cial data and repeated the analysis with ratings now con-
strained to integer values (1–5). As shown in Fig. 1c,d,g,h,
this quantization has a substantial negative effect on per-
formance, with σmax = 0 in particular being disastrous for
all reputation algorithms. As σmax increases, ∆Q, τ and
object and user AUC improve—and then, in some cases,
∆Q and object AUC worsen again. We also notice that
the relative performance of the methods with respect to
∆Q and object AUC is inverted for σmax < 2, with YZLM
the worst-performing of the algorithms, regaining its su-
periority only when the upper error bound is large.
The apparent paradox of better performance resulting
from increasing error can be explained as follows. Imag-
ine an object with ‘true’ quality 3.4 being assessed by two
distinct groups of users, the first whose quality assessment
is always error-free (σi = 0), the second whose error lev-
5 The degree of superiority shown by YZLM actually depends
both on the value of σmin and the difference σmax − σmin. We do
not provide a detailed illustration of this for reasons of space, but
the effect can be observed in the differences in asymptotic values of
AUC between the upper and lower panels of Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: (colour online) The dependency of algorithm per-
formance on the discrete rating resolution R, measured by
(a, b) ∆Q for objects and (c, d) AUC for users. The upper
error bound σmax = R − 1 covers the full rating range, while
lower error bounds are (a, c) σmin = 0, (b, d) σmin = σmax/8.
Other parameter values are as in Fig. 1.
els are set at σi = 0.5 (i.e. the average error level of a
user from a group with error levels σi drawn from U [0; 1]).
Users from the first group will of course make correct qual-
ity judgements qiα = Qα, but the discrete rating system
forces them to adopt the nearest integer value of 3. The
resulting average (also 3) will thus differ from the true
quality by 0.4. By contrast the ‘noisy’ users’ quality esti-
mates will be distributed uniformly in the range Qα ± 0.5
and so on average 60% of them will give a discrete rating
of 3 and 40% will give 4, leaving an average of 3.4—that is,
on average a perfect match to the original quality value.
Effectively, the constraint of discrete ratings produces a
systematic quantization error, which ‘noisy’ users can off-
set in the same way that dither can reduce quantization
error in signal processing [14].
A slightly more subtle argument is needed to explain
the bad performance of YZLM when faced with any but
the largest levels of error. Here we note that, while the
aggregate error of low-σi agents may be greater, their in-
dividual error will still on average be less. YZLM, with its
strong bias towards users with low observed error rates,
will thus favour these users, suppressing noisy agents and
consequently harming aggregate performance. This is con-
firmed by Fig. 1g,h, where we observe that while overall ac-
curacy of user ranking (Kendall’s τ) suffers with low σmax,
the high AUC values indicate that the lowest-σi users are
still being pushed towards the top of the ranking. As σmax
increases, aggregate error of the wider population grows
and YZLM’s suppression of high individual error rates acts
to suppress this, sustaining its performance while the other
algorithms suffer.
To better understand the effects of changing the rating
resolution, we performed simulations where user error was
fixed in proportion to the width of the rating scale, and
varied the value of R while taking discrete ratings. Fig. 2
shows the results for two sets of simulations, the first with
σmin = 0, the second with σmin = σmax/8, using ∆Q/(R−
1) and AUC to measure performance in assessing objects
(a, b) and users (c, d) respectively. In both cases σmax =
R− 1, so that the maximum possible user error covers the
full range of the rating scale.
As we increase the rating resolution R, we observe a
gradual approach to asymptotic values of object (∆Q) and
user (AUC) performance comparable to those obtained
with continuous-valued ratings. Similar to Fig. 1c, there
is a marked difference between YZLM and the other al-
gorithms with respect to ∆Q. Whereas AA, Mizz and
dKVD have only a limited response to increasing resolu-
tion, YZLM is able to reap a significant benefit, with its
performance sustaining continuous improvement even asR
approaches 20. The reason is made clear by Fig. 2c, where
we observe that unlike the other algorithms, increasing R
permits YZLM to push the lowest-σi users consistently to
the very top of the ranking (AUC→ 1).
YZLM’s dependency on low-σi raters is further empha-
sized by Fig. 2b, where the performance of AA, Mizz
and dKVD are little affected by the higher value of σmin
but where now YZLM performs better for binary ratings
(again, the ‘increased noise=better performance’ paradox)
while no longer sustaining any significant improvements
in ∆Q for R > 3. When observing AUC for user rank-
ing (Fig. 2d), we observe that now YZLM too is unable
to consistently push the lowest-σi users to the top, with
asymptotic AUC values now near-identical to dKVD.
Discussion. – Psychometric research has put consid-
erable effort into understanding the effectiveness and reli-
ability of different rating scales, particularly with respect
to the scale resolution [15–18]. Factors to take into ac-
count include both the information-carrying capacity of
the scale and the information-processing capacity of re-
spondents [19], as well as psychological influences such as
the descriptive labels associated with responses [20].
The relevance of these factors depends on exactly what
kind of information one wants to extract from the scale. If
the aim is to aggregate or average over respondents, three
or even two discrete response options may suffice [16].
Conversely, if the focus is on individual difference, finer-
grained scales become necessary [17].
Co-determination algorithms are prima facie aggrega-
tion mechanisms, but they also employ measures of indi-
vidual difference to improve the aggregation process [6–8].
The effect of rating resolution on their performance will
therefore depend on several factors, including the degree
to which there are meaningful and reliable differences in
user rating ability, whether the scale is fine-grained enough
to accurately reflect those differences, and the algorithm’s
ability to measure and exploit this information if it exists.
In this letter we have investigated the influence of
p-5
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low rating resolution on the performance of several co-
determination reputation and ranking algorithms. While
the presence of an non-zero optimal noise level (Fig. 1c,d)
may be seen as a mere mathematical curiosity—in ef-
fect an example of quantization error being reduced by
the application of dither [14]—the worsened performance
of these methods is an important finding. Psychometric
studies have in general suggested that there is little bene-
fit to be had from using more than 7 discrete rating cate-
gories [15]. Our results suggest that in fact this may pre-
vent the maximum exploitation of rating data, precluding
the fine-grained observation of individual difference nec-
essary to improve the aggregation process. A comparison
can be drawn to models of opinion dynamics inspired by
the Potts model, where if the number of spin/opinion val-
ues is too few, opinions become homogenized across the
population, while as q → ∞, diverse regions of different
opinion can be preserved [21].
We have also shown that, where the rating resolution
is high enough, co-determination algorithms—particularly
YZLM—are able to achieve significantly better results
than a mere arithmetic average. Given that psychome-
tric studies have not shown any major disadvantages of
using higher-resolution scales [18], it may thus be prefer-
able for modern rating and reputation systems to employ
continuous-valued scales such as the graphic rating scale
or the visual analogue scale [22]. In an online world such
scales can be implemented easily through the use of per-
centage scores or slider bars [23]. Empirical studies em-
ploying these and other rating methods should be able to
determine if and when respondents are in practice able to
achieve the required precision of judgement, and so help to
identify the situations where a sophisticated method may
yield superior performance.
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